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Abstract
Using dynamic panel models with data for 62 developing countries, this paper exam-
ines whether growth in agriculture elicits growth in manufacturing. For identification, I use
population-weighted, average temperature as an instrument for growth in agriculture. I iden-
tify large short-run effects: An increase in growth in agriculture by one percentage point is
estimated to raise contemporaneous growth in manufacturing by between 0.47 and 0.56 per-
centage points. The baseline models also imply sizable long-run effects of permanent increases
in growth in agriculture. Extensions of the empirical model suggest that growth in agriculture
benefits the manufacturing sector by improving its domestic terms of trade, by increasing the
share of investment and saving in GDP, and by increasing the capacity to import industrial
inputs.
The paper makes two main contributions. First, it joins a growing literature using climate
data to identify supply shocks in agriculture, establishing a robust empirical relation between
these shocks and growth in manufacturing. Second, it includes a stylized two-sector model
to illuminate the macroeconomic channels behind this complementarity. Together, these con-
tributions lend support to the notion that agriculture plays key macroeconomic roles in the
industrialization of developing countries by relieving saving, aggregate demand, fiscal, and
foreign exchange constraints on the industrial sector.
Keywords: Agricultural Productivity, Industrialization, Multisector Growth.
JEL Classification Codes: O130, O140, O410.
1 Introduction
There is little doubt that the expansion of industrial activities and their ancillary services char-
acterizes sustained episodes of economic growth in developing countries.1 But the initial stages
of industrialization almost invariably impinge on societies where agriculture accounts for a large
share of output and employment.
Several recent studies have underscored the role of agriculture in generating favorable initial
conditions for modern economic growth. Their dominant theme is the historical pattern of land
∗PhD candidate, Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts-Amherst. I would like to thank J. Mohan
Rao, Peter Skott, James Heintz, as well as the participants of the 2014 Advanced Graduate Student Workshop in
Bangalore, India, and the 2014 Eastern Economic Association conference in Boston, USA, for helpful comments on
previous versions of this paper. I would also like to thank Michael Keen and Thomas Baunsgaard for making their
dataset available. I am responsible for all remaining errors.
1For recent evidence on the relation between structural change and economic development, see Timmer and Vries
(2009), Ocampo et al. (2009), and McMillan and Rodrik (2011).
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ownership and its lasting influence on the distribution of income and education, on the incidence
of social conflict, and on the development of institutions of economic and political governance.2
And yet, beyond the lasting political-economic influence of agrarian structure, agriculture
also plays macroeconomic roles in industrialization. They include providing saving and foreign
exchange to finance capital accumulation, as well as a home market for industry (Johnston and
Mellor, 1961). Their fulfillment is a key ingredient of successful industrialization, as recognized
by Alice Amsden in regard to Taiwan’s post-war experience:
Agriculture managed to produce a food supply sufficient to meet minimum domestic
consumption requirements as well as a residual for export. [...] Good rice harvests
have been a major factor behind price (and real wage) stability. [...] Agriculture also
managed to provide an important source of demand for Taiwan’s industrial output,
particularly chemicals and tools, and a mass market for consumption goods. [...] In
summary, agriculture in Taiwan gave industrial capital a labor force, a surplus, and
foreign exchange. (Amsden, 1979, p. 363)
This paper estimates whether growth in agriculture elicits growth in manufacturing, providing
reduced-form evidence of macroeconomic linkages between the two sectors. Using average tem-
perature to identify changes in agricultural supply in 62 developing countries, I estimate that a
one percentage point increase in growth in agriculture raises contemporaneous growth in manu-
facturing by between 0.47 and 0.56 percentage points.
As discussed below, annual variation in temperature is best suited to identify short-run effects.
Still, the implied long-run multipliers show that if the average country in the sample were to
permanently increase growth in agriculture to 4.4%/yr (the average in China during 1961-2006),
growth in manufacturing would eventually increase by between 0.95 and 1 percentage points. This
effect is substantial, as the sample mean of growth in manufacturing is 4.5%/yr.
Estimating the effect of growth in agriculture using country-level data is challenging for two
main reasons. First, countries differ along time-constant dimensions, such as natural conditions,
that are correlated with growth in agriculture. To address this problem, I control for country fixed
effects, using only relative variation within countries to identify the coefficients.
Second, regressions relating growth in the two sectors are likely to run afoul of bias due to
reverse causality and omitted time-varying variables. To address these problems, I control for the
previous dynamics of growth in manufacturing, and use a population-weighted measure of average
annual temperature (from Dell et al., 2012a) as an instrument for growth in agriculture. I therefore
assume that annual variation in average temperature within countries, while exogenously shifting
agricultural supply, does not directly affect growth in manufacturing. Section 6 below further
discusses the appropriateness of this assumption.
Besides estimating the reduced-form effect of growth in agriculture on growth in manufacturing,
I make two additional contributions. First, to illuminate the main findings, I present a concise
model of macroeconomic complementarity between the two sectors. The model examines how
agriculture can relieve constraints on industrial accumulation that have featured prominently in
the growth literature — namely saving, demand, foreign exchange, and fiscal constraints.
2For recent studies linking historical inequality in land ownership to measures of broad-based educational attain-
ment, see Engerman and Sokoloff (2002), Frankema (2009), Wegenast (2009), and Galor et al. (2009). For a study
of the link between agrarian structure and urban income inequality, see Oyvat (2013). Recent studies of the link
between patterns of colonization — including policies concerning land ownership and land tenure — and the devel-
opment of institutions of economic and political governance include Acemoglu et al. (2000, 2002, 2005), Engerman
and Sokoloff (2002), and Rodrik et al. (2004). For earlier examples from the Latin American historiography, see
Prado Junior (1967), and Furtado (1963, 1976).
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Second, I use the same identification strategy to explore a number of proximate indicators
of these channels of complementarity. I find that growth in agriculture improves the domestic
terms of trade of the non-agricultural sector, increases the share of investment and saving in GDP,
increases the capacity to import industrial inputs, and reallocates workers to activities with higher
average productivity.
In sum, this paper joins a growing literature using climate data to identify supply shocks in
agriculture (see Dell et al., 2013, for a broad review). It is particularly related to papers that
have used this identification strategy to establish causal relations between agricultural growth and
broader economic outcomes, such as local urban activity (Henderson et al., 2009), patterns of
migration (Bru¨ckner, 2012), and industrial growth (Shifa, 2014, to whose empirical strategy this
paper is closest). It also summarizes key propositions of the historical and theoretical literatures on
macroeconomic relations between the two sectors, encapsulating them in a concise, though stylized,
two-sector model. Together, these two contributions lend support to the notion that agriculture
plays key macroeconomic roles in the industrialization of developing countries by relieving saving,
aggregate demand, fiscal, and foreign exchange constraints on the industrial sector. Agricultural
development should thus be a key ingredient of industrial development policies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates the question in relation to the existing
empirical and theoretical literature. Section 3 describes the dataset and introduces the empiri-
cal model. Section 5 presents the main empirical results of the paper: the effect of growth in
agriculture on growth in manufacturing using temperature as an instrumental variable. Section
6 examines the effects of controlling for cross-country heterogeneity along several dimensions —
such as the share of agriculture in GDP and the degree of openness to international trade —, as
well as other robustness checks; Section 7 examines the impact of agricultural growth on poten-
tial channels through which it would enhance industrial growth. Section 8 illustrates the main
macroeconomic channels of complementarity between the two sectors by means of a stylized model.
Section 9 summarizes the main findings and implications of the paper, and an Appendix provides
model proofs and detailed variable definitions.
2 Agricultural Development and Industrialization
Most of the recent empirical literature consists of reduced-form tests of whether output or pro-
ductivity growth in agriculture bolster their counterparts in other sectors. To address reverse
causality and omitted variable bias, most authors have deployed time series techniques or instru-
mental variables.
A group of studies has used cointegration and error correction models to estimate long-run
sectoral balance relations, followed by an examination of sectoral responses to deviations from
this equilibrium. Studies of individual countries have yielded mixed results: Gemmell et al. (2000)
found that manufacturing output and productivity in Malaysia were exogenous (in the sense of
Granger) to increases in their counterparts in agriculture. By contrast, Kanwar (2000), and Chebbi
and Lachaal (2007) found that they responded positively in India and Tunisia. A study of panel
cointegration using a sample of 85 countries, however, confirmed the finding of positive responses
for the majority of countries in the sample (Tiffin and Irz, 2006).
By contrast, this paper follows an alternative, but increasingly common strategy: the identifi-
cation of exogenous shifts in agricultural value added from variation in climate variables, such as
rainfall and temperature (Dell et al., 2013). Some of these studies examine the regional impact of
growth in agriculture. For example, Henderson et al. (2009) find that the intensity of city lights
at night increases in years of favorable rainfall in adjacent rural areas. Their results, derived from
satellite images of 541 cities in 18 African countries, indicate substantial local complementarity
between the rural and urban economies.
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But macroeconomic complementarity can be better discerned at a higher level of aggregation.
To that end, Dell et al. (2012a) build average measures of nationwide temperature and rainfall,
using local population as weights. They find that GDP growth declines in poor countries when
temperature is higher than the historical average.
Changes in agricultural yields are the channel most likely to explain these reduced-form re-
lations between climate variables and economic growth. Several authors have therefore used
country-level climate variables as instruments for output and productivity in agriculture. For
example, using precipitation as an instrumental variable (along with international commodity
prices), Bru¨ckner (2012) finds that lower value added in agriculture leads to distress migration
and the expansion of urban informal activities. In turn, using temperature and precipitation as
instrumental variables, Shifa (2014) finds that higher growth in agriculture elicits sizable short-run
increases in growth in manufacturing in a large sample of countries.
The empirical findings above raise a natural question: what macroeconomic mechanisms ex-
plain the observed complementarity between agricultural and industrial development? The answer,
formalized in the simple model of section 8, is that agriculture can ease saving, demand, foreign
exchange, and fiscal constraints on industrial accumulation. These roles of agriculture have been
explored in a number of previous contributions.
Traditional development theory, for example, saw the availability of domestic saving as the
main constraint on the rate of capital accumulation. Many authors thus called on agriculture
to elicit higher saving from the private non-agricultural sector, in particular industry. This role
is predicated on three notions: first, that most saving originates in retained profits and other
non-wage incomes; second, that unit costs are a key determinant of real industrial saving in terms
of its own output; and, third, that in dual economies agricultural labor productivity is a key
determinant of industrial unit costs.
Arthur Lewis laid out the classical model along these lines. By linking money wages in industry
to the value of the average product in agriculture, Lewis suggested that agricultural development
will raise industrial accumulation if the fall in agriculture’s domestic terms of trade dominates the
increase in industrial wages in terms of food (Lewis, 1954, p. 173-176). The presence of Engel’s
Law in final demand — the proposition that the share of primary goods in total expenditure falls
as income increases — is crucial to ensure this result (Jorgenson, 1961, 1967).
An exception may arise if the terms of trade are unresponsive to agricultural growth — consider,
for example, a small open economy in which both sectors produce tradable goods. In this case,
higher labor incomes in agriculture will directly raise unit labor costs in terms of the industrial
good (Skott and Larudee, 1998; Bustos et al., 2012). Detailed case studies of intersectoral resource
flows in developing countries, however, show that periods of technical dynamism in agriculture
often correlated with endogenous declines in the sector’s domestic terms of trade (Mellor, 1973;
Karshenas, 1995). By contrast, where industrial growth occurred alongside a stagnant agriculture,
such as in India during 1950-1965, net resources flowed out of the non-agricultural sector due to
adverse movements in the terms of trade, potentially hindering the ability to finance capital
accumulation in industry (Mody et al., 1982).3
The notion that private saving is the binding constraint on industrial growth has been chal-
lenged on three fronts: by those emphasizing fiscal constraints on complementary public invest-
ment, by those emphasizing balance-of-payments constraints on the expansion of domestic demand,
3To be sure, agriculture can also contribute saving to non-agriculture directly by accumulating net assets. But
if Engel’s effects are strong, technical progress in agriculture may reduce the real value of net lending in terms of
the industrial good, due to adverse movements in the terms of trade. In other words, a trade-off may exist between
agriculture’s ability to directly contribute net saving to non-agriculture, and its ability to indirectly elicit higher
saving from non-agriculture (see section 8 for a formal example). In a review of episodes of industrial growth in
Asia, Karshenas (1995) shows that most growth accelerations were financed with ex-post increases in saving from
non-agriculture.
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and by those emphasizing insufficient domestic demand even in the absence of balance-of-payments
constraints.
Public infrastructure and private investment may be bound by direct technical complemen-
tarity in industrializing economies. Expected demand may justify private projects, yet investors
may fail to undertake them in the absence of complementary public investment in energy or trans-
portation.4 In addition, infrastructure is often subject to increasing returns to scale and market
failures, and it is largely non-tradable. These characteristics hinder the ability of private investors
to sustain the required level of infrastructural investment (Skott and Ros, 1997).
Agriculture, as it turns out, has often been a prominent source of fiscal revenues in indus-
trializing economies. For example, the direct taxation of agricultural rents was key for funding
infrastructure investment during the first several decades of Japan’s industrialization (Ohkawa
and Rosovsky, 1960). But due to technical or political constraints, in most post-war episodes of
industrialization governments resorted to instruments of indirect taxation, such as trade tariffs
and quotas, multiple exchange rates, and domestic marketing boards. As a result, wedges be-
tween the actual terms of trade of agriculture and border prices were common, with governments
often capturing the implied transfers as fiscal or quasi-fiscal revenues (Peterson, 1979; Oliveira,
1985; Rao, 1989b; Schiff and Valde´s, 1998). The importance of these mechanisms in generating
fiscal revenues became evident in the wake of recent episodes of market liberalization across the
developing world, which often worsened fiscal constraints (Khattry and Rao, 2002; Baunsgaard
and Keen, 2010).
Prescriptions for raising private domestic saving or fiscal revenues, however, may be ineffective
if industrial accumulation is constrained by insufficient foreign exchange earnings (Chenery and
Bruno, 1962; Bacha, 1990; Taylor, 1994). Developing countries have limited scope for running
persistent current account deficits, and yet expanding their incipient industrial sectors requires
imported capital goods and intermediate inputs. Under a foreign exchange constraint, agriculture
can bolster industrial accumulation by producing crops for export or by reducing food imports.
Finally, domestic demand may fail to justify private investment projects, and international
trade may afford scarce possibilities to offset this shortfall, especially in the short-run. Private
investment may thus be deficient even without ex ante saving or foreign exchange constraints,
causing the economy to come under a Keynesian aggregate demand constraint.
A number of two-sector models in the post-Keynesian and Structuralist traditions have shown
that technical progress in agriculture can relieve demand constraints on industrial accumulation.
In common, they posit that firms make independent investment decisions with an eye to expected
profitability, and that mechanisms — such as changes in functional distribution or capacity utiliza-
tion — exist to endogenously bring ex-post saving into line with desired investment. Agriculture
can be a source of autonomous demand for industry by purchasing industrial inputs and, in the
presence of Engel’s effects, by reducing the cost to workers of meeting their income-inelastic de-
mand for food (see, e.g.: Taylor, 1982, 1983; Dutt, 1992; Rao, 1993; Skott, 1999; Rada, 2007).
The model in section 8 further examines these four channels of macroeconomic complementarity
— the easing of saving, demand, foreign exchange, and fiscal constraints — in a formal setting. It
shows that supply shocks to agriculture can quickly affect domestic demand, industrial profitability,
foreign exchange receipts, and government revenues. These shocks can thus sway the output
growth and capital accumulation decisions of industrial firms. The model therefore casts light on
key reasons behind the main reduced-form empirical findings of this paper: that higher growth in
agriculture elicits higher growth in manufacturing. The following sections describe these empirical
findings.
4For empirical evidence concerning developing countries, see Belloc and Vertova (2006), Romp and De Haan
(2007), and Canning and Pedroni (2008).
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3 Data and Empirical Model
My empirical model uses sectoral value added data from the World Development Indicators (WDI).
I exclude developed and transition economies, as well as countries with less than one million inhab-
itants. I also exclude countries with less than 25 consecutive observations, to mitigate inference
distortions caused by short panels (I relax some of these constraints to check the robustness of the
results, see section 6). The resulting unbalanced panel boasts 62 countries, spans the 1960-2006
period, and has on average 36 observations per country5.
As shown in table 2, the sample mean of growth in agriculture is quite low: 2.6%/yr. Agricul-
tural growth is also volatile, with an overall standard deviation of 8.6%. At 4.5%/yr, the sample
mean of growth in manufacturing is higher, but also volatile, with an an overall standard devia-
tion of 8.5%. Perhaps surprisingly, a standard decomposition attributes most of this volatility to
variation in growth within countries, as opposed to variation in growth across countries. In other
words, most countries achieve high growth in both sectors, but few sustain it over time. Growth
volatility is especially pronounced in Sub-Saharan Africa.
By contrast, population-weighted average temperature varies substantially across countries,
but not within countries over time. The ‘between’ component of the standard deviation is nearly
4.5oC, while the ‘within’ component is only 0.5oC.
The regressions estimated in this paper follow a dynamic panel specification which allows for
the propagation of short-run variation in agricultural growth over time
∆ln(VAM )i,t = β0 +
p∑
n=1
αn∆ln(VAM )i,t−n +
q∑
j=0
βj∆ln(VAA)i,t−j + γZi,t + i + t + i,t (1)
where VAM and VAA denote real value added in manufacturing and agriculture. The subscripts
i and t index countries and years, ∆ denotes first differences, and Zi,t denotes a vector of controls.
As is standard in panel data analysis, the baseline model decomposes the unobserved residual
into a time-constant portion that is specific to each country (i), a time-varying portion that is
common to all countries (t), and a time-varying portion that is specific to each country (i,t).
By including lags of the dependent variable, the specification in (1) controls for the past
dynamics of growth in manufacturing. Estimating it using the standard ’within’ estimator thus
addresses two sources of bias. First, it controls for idiosyncratic country characteristics correlated
with the performance of agriculture; second, it ensures that growth in agriculture is conditionally
uncorrelated with past growth in manufacturing.
Still, a causal interpretation of the coefficients requires the assumption that growth in agricul-
ture is uncorrelated to the contemporaneous and lagged error terms, conditional on past growth
in manufacturing, the country and year fixed effects, and any other covariates included in Zi,t:
E[i,t∆ln(VAA)i,s] = 0, ∀ s ≤ t (2)
4 Benchmark Estimates
The assumption in (2) is likely to fail due to omitted variable bias, motivating the use of temper-
ature as an instrument for growth in agriculture. Before describing those estimates, however, it is
5Although the WDI dataset goes beyond 2006, that is the last year for which measures of population-weighted
temperature are available. To ensure comparability across specifications, I restrict the sample to 1960-2006 in all
models.
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useful to establish benchmarks — based on the identifying assumption in (2) — against which to
compare them. This section describes two such benchmarks. The first is obtained by estimating
equation (1) with annual data and the within estimator. The second is obtained by estimating
it with growth in manufacturing over non-overlapping five-year periods, in order to establish a
medium-term association that does not use annual variation for coefficient identification.
Columns (1)-(3) in table 3 show the model in (1) estimated with annual data and the within
estimator. Each specification includes two lags of growth in manufacturing6. Column (1) only
includes contemporaneous growth in agriculture which, as we can see, has a positive and statis-
tically significant association with growth in manufacturing. But this contemporaneous effect is
small: an increase in agricultural growth by one percentage point is a associated with an increase
in growth in manufacturing of only 0.10 percentage point. Columns (2) and (3) include up to
three lags of growth in agriculture. Only the first two lags are positive and individually significant
(deeper lags are also insignificant, but they are not reported).
The dynamic specifications in columns (1)-(3) allow us to compute cumulative effects by as-
suming a permanent increase in growth in agriculture.7 As table 3 shows, the estimated long-run
multipliers are statistically significant — the multiplier in column (2) implies that a permanent
increase in growth in agriculture by one percentage point is associated with an increase of 0.32
percentage point in growth in manufacturing after enough years elapse.
The empirical model allows for both fixed effects and lags of the dependent variable. The
within transformation therefore creates a mechanical correlation between the lagged dependent
variable and the error term (Nickell, 1981). The resulting bias converges to zero as the number
of time periods increase, so it is unlikely to be large given the average of 36 observations per
country. Still, to address this potential problem, column (4) shows the specification in column (2)
estimated using a system GMM procedure in the spirit of Arellano and Bond (1991), and Arellano
and Bover (1995). The procedure applies forward orthogonal deviations to the variables in order
to eliminate panel-specific fixed effects, using lags of the untransformed variables as instruments
for the transformed variables. The identifying assumption is:
E[∗i,t+1(∆ln(VAM )i,s−1,∆ln(VAA)i,s)
′] = 0, ∀ s ≤ t (3)
where ∗i,t+1 indicates the forward orthogonal deviation of i,t.
8 If there is no autocorrelation
in the error term of second (or higher) order, the first (and deeper) lags of the variables in levels
are valid instruments for the transformed lagged dependent variables.9 The existence of second-
order autocorrelation in the error term can be tested using the data, but a causal interpretation
of the coefficients on agricultural growth still hinges on the assumption in (2). The coefficients
on agricultural growth show a small decline with the system GMM procedure, but growth in
manufacturing shows greater persistence, so that the long-run multiplier declines only slightly.
Columns (5)-(7) present the second set of benchmark estimates, which modify the empirical
model in two ways. First, I measure growth in manufacturing over non-overlapping five-year
6Deeper lags were never statistically significant, and their inclusion did not alter the results.
7The long-run multiplier that embodies this assumption of a permanent increase is given by∑q
j=0 βj
(
1−∑pn=1 αn)−1, where βj and αn are the coefficients on growth in agriculture and manufacturing, and q
and p are the respective number of lags, as defined in (1).
8The time subscript reflects the practice of storing orthogonal deviations one period late, for consistency with
other commonly used transformations, such as first differences (Roodman, 2006). In other words, ∗i,t+1 = ci,t(i,t−
Ti,t
−1∑Ti,t
j=t+1 i,t), where Ti,t indicates the number of available future observations, and ci,t =
√
Ti,t/Ti,t + 1 is a
scaling factor.
9The system GMM approach also estimates equations with the untransformed variables, now using lags of the
transformed lagged dependent variables as instruments. These instruments are by construction purged of correlation
with the unobserved fixed effects, and it is also assumed that they are uncorrelated with other components of the
contemporaneous error term. The use of these additional moment conditions to estimate a ’stacked’ system is shown
to increase efficiency (Arellano and Bover, 1995).
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periods, starting with 1960-1965 (I annualize the result for ease of interpretation). Second, I
decompose the right-hand-side variables into two types: a set of ‘flow’ variables measured as
annual averages over each growth period, including growth in agriculture; and a set of ‘stock’
variables measured at the beginning of each growth period (see Caselli et al., 1996, for further
discussion of this specification).
Since the transformed dataset has few time periods, I estimate all the specifications using the
Arellano-Bond-Bover procedure. The specification in column (5) includes only period dummies and
one lag of the dependent variable, in addition to growth in agriculture. In turn, the specifications
in columns (6) and (7) attempt to attenuate omitted variable bias by including two different
sets of flow and stock variables. These variables capture external and domestic macroeconomic
conditions, such as the initial level of GDP per capita and the external terms of trade (for a
detailed description of the variables in each set, see table B.1 in the Appendix). As we can see,
the estimates in columns (6) and (7) imply that an increase by one percentage point in average
growth in agriculture is associated with an increase in annual growth in manufacturing of between
0.49 to 0.52 percentage points over a five-year period. These medium-run estimates exceed the
corresponding short-run OLS estimates obtained using annual data, as well as the sum of lagged
coefficients in columns (2) or (4). I consider these to be the benchmark medium-run estimates
obtained without external instrumental variables.
5 Instrumental Variable Estimates
The benchmark estimates above address important sources of bias, but in order to obtain causal
estimates one needs a source of variation in agricultural output that is uncorrelated with relevant
omitted variables. Dell et al. (2012a) provide a candidate instrumental variable for growth in
agriculture: annual variation in country-level average temperature.
To construct their measure, Dell et al. (2012a) aggregated monthly local temperature mea-
surements available in the larger Terrestrial Air Temperature and Precipitation Gridded Monthly
Time Series dataset (Matsuura and Willmott, 2009). The original measurements were interpolated
from a number of weather stations, and then made available on a spatial grid with a resolution of
0.5ox0.5o of latitude and longitude (at the equator, each grid node corresponds to approximately
56km2). Dell et al. (2012a) weighted these local measurements by local population, using a sur-
vey conducted by the Global Rural-Urban Mapping Project in 1990 (CIESIN et al., 2004). This
weighting scheme rests on the assumption that land near populated areas is cultivated more in-
tensively than land in remote areas. Other weighting schemes yielded little change to the authors’
estimates of the reduced-form impact of temperature on a number of economic outcomes (Dell
et al., 2012b).
The instrumental variable estimates in this section maintain the following identifying assump-
tion:
E[i,t ln(wtem)i,s] = 0, ∀ s ≤ t (4)
where ln(wtem)i,s denotes the log of population-weighted temperature. I further discuss this
assumption, along with other robustness checks, in section 6.
5.1 ‘First Stage’ and Reduced Form Regressions
Columns (1)-(4) in table 4 examine changes in population-weighted average temperature as exoge-
nous shifters of countrywide agricultural supply. They show fixed-effects regressions of growth in
agriculture against up to three lags of the logarithm of contemporaneous temperature (ln(wtem)i,t).
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Year dummies and two lags of growth in manufacturing are also included, since they are part of
the structural model of interest.
All specifications show a negative contemporaneous effect of higher temperature on growth
in agriculture. The effect is practically large and statistically significant. An increase in average
temperature of one ’within’ standard deviation (about 0.025 log points, or 0.5o C) is predicted to
cut between 0.82 and 1.17 percentage points of the contemporaneous growth rate in agricultural
value added, according to the estimates in columns (1) and (2). This is a large short-run decline,
as the unconditional mean of agricultural growth is only 2.6%/yr.
The specifications in columns (2)-(4) add deeper lags of average temperature. As we can see,
as temperature returns to its long-run average after a shock, crop yields tend to return to normal.
This fact is shown in the positive and significant coefficient of the second lag of temperature —
i.e.: holding contemporaneous average temperature constant, higher temperature in the previous
year is expected to increase agricultural growth in the current year. Deeper lags of average
temperature are statistically insignificant, suggesting that the effect of a one-off temperature shock
on agricultural growth is confined to the short run.
These findings confirm the findings in Dell et al. (2012a) regarding the effects of average
temperature on agricultural growth in poor countries.10 They also resonate with the broader
literature on the effects of temperature on crop yields, based both on controlled experiments and
reduced-form estimates (see, e.g. Adams et al., 1990; Mendelsohn et al., 2000; Parry et al., 2007;
Deschenes and Greenstone, 2007; Guiteras, 2009).
Columns (6)-(8) show that higher-than-average temperature hurts growth in manufacturing. In
fact, the reduced-form relationship between temperature and growth in manufacturing resembles
the relationship between temperature and growth in agriculture, as indicated by the signs of the
contemporaneous and lagged coefficients. This finding is reassuring, since reduced-form estimates
are free of the bias inherent in instrumental variable estimates (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). More
importantly, it suggests that short-run variation in growth in agriculture is driving the reduced-
form effect of temperature on manufacturing.
5.2 Baseline Results
Table 5 presents different specifications of the empirical model in equation (1) with the log of
average temperature as an instrument for growth in agriculture. Column (1) displays the results
of estimating a just-identified version of the model — with no lags of growth in agriculture, and
only contemporaneous temperature as an instrument. By having as many excluded instruments as
endogenous variables, this specification is least likely to suffer from weak-instrument bias (Angrist
and Pischke, 2008). It estimates a positive, large, and statistically significant effect of growth in
agriculture on contemporaneous growth in manufacturing.
Column (2) adds one lag of temperature to the instrument set.11 The estimate remains large,
but about one and a half decimal point lower than in the just-identified model. An increase
in growth in agriculture by one percentage point is now predicted to increase contemporaneous
growth in manufacturing by 0.54 percentage points — over five times higher than its counterpart
estimated by OLS (compare it with column 1 in table 3).
Column (4) adds two lags of growth in agriculture, with a total of three lags of tempera-
ture in the instrument set. The additional lags have positive coefficients, and these are also
10Dell et al. (2012a) define poor countries as those whose PPP-adjusted GDP per capita is below the sample
median in the first year the country enters their dataset, which includes both developing and developed countries.
11I estimate the overidentified models by GMM, although the results change little if two-stage least squares are
used instead.
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higher than their counterparts in the models estimated by OLS. Conditional on current agricul-
tural growth, however, the effects of past agricultural growth are too imprecisely estimated to be
deemed individually significant. This fact indicates that annual variation in temperature, with
its strong mean-reverting character, is best suited for identifying short-run effects of agricultural
growth. Seen from a different angle, the coefficients identified on the basis of short-run variation
in temperature do not reflect longer-term changes to the economic landscape — such as technical
change, or trade and macroeconomic policies — that could follow in the wake of persistent changes
in growth in agriculture.
As a result, even though the implied long-run multipliers in the specifications with lagged agri-
cultural growth are statistically significant, I adopt the short-run coefficients of the specifications
without lags (such as that in column 2), as well as their associated long-run multipliers, as the base-
line estimates. The addition of lags of agricultural growth hardly changes these contemporaneous
coefficients.
Columns (3) and (5)-(7) address two potential shortcomings of the specifications just described.
First, to address concerns with Nickell bias, columns (6) and (7) show the same specifications as
those of columns (2) and (4), but now estimated using the Arellano-Bover-Bond procedure. As
we can see, the estimated short-run effect of growth in agriculture is about a decimal point lower
(but still significant). At the same time, growth in manufacturing exhibits more persistence, so
differences in the long-run multipliers are small.
In turn, the specifications in columns (3) and (5) are estimated by the Limited Information
Maximum Likelihood (LIML) method, to address concerns with weak instrument bias. These
estimates are close to those obtained in columns (2) and (4), providing clear evidence against bias.
Simulations show that LIML brings significant improvements in median bias relative to stan-
dard standard methods in finite samples with multiple weak instruments. As instrument strength
improves, the difference in median estimates between LIML and standard methods declines, indi-
cating a decline in median bias in the latter (Flores-Lagunes, 2007).
Formal tests of weak identification confirm these findings. These testing procedures, originated
by Anderson and Rubin (1949), are based on the joint significance of the external instruments in
reduced-form regressions like those of table 4.12 Table 5 reports an Anderson-Rubin Wald statistic
that is robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, as well as a closely related LM statistic
proposed by Stock and Wright (2000). As we can see, both statistics lead us to reject the null
hypothesis of weak identification in all specifications.
The LIML method also improves inference in the presence of weak instruments by reducing size
distortions (Stock and Yogo, 2005). To illustrate this property, table 5 reports the Cragg-Donald
Wald statistic, which is based on the joint significance of the excluded instruments in explaining
the endogenous regressors. The computed values should be measured against the critical values
obtained by Stock and Yogo (2005), which indicate cutoffs for maximum levels of size distortion.
These critical values were reported only when available. Both the Cragg-Donald statistic and the
critical values, however, assume i.i.d. disturbances.13 A comparison of columns (3) and (2) reveals
lower critical values for the model estimated by LIML, indicating that, given the strength of the
instruments, LIML suffers less size distortion than the standard GMM estimator.
In sum, the instrumental variable estimates reveal a large and statistically significant short-run
effect of growth in agriculture on growth in manufacturing. If we take the parsimonious LIML and
12If the exclusion restriction is valid, the reduced-form coefficients can be considered a function of both of the
effect of growth in agriculture on growth in manufacturing (i.e. the coefficients of the structural equation of interest)
and of the effect of temperature on growth in agriculture (i.e. the coefficients on the excluded instruments in the
first-stage regression). A weak first-stage relation would thus lead to insignificant coefficients in the reduced-form
regression (for more details, see Baum et al., 2007).
13I also report the closely related Kleibergen-Paap Wald statistic, which is robust to heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation, but without accompanying critical values.
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system GMM estimates in columns (3) and (6) as the baseline, an increase in growth in agriculture
by one percentage point is expected to raise contemporaneous growth in manufacturing by between
0.47 and 0.56 percentage points.
The calculated long-run multipliers are also statistically significant and of similar magnitude
(0.53 and 0.58). They suggest that if the average country in the sample were to permanently
increase the rate of growth in agriculture by 1.8 percentage points (reaching the same rate exhibited
by China during the sample period), the predicted long-run increase in growth in manufacturing
would range between 0.95 and 1 percentage point. Such a sustained effort to raise growth in
agriculture would be a remarkable achievement, as the sample mean of growth in agriculture, as
seen in section 3, is only 2.6%/yr. Even though the long-run multipliers should be interpreted
with caution — as they were estimated on the basis of short-run variation in the instrument —,
they suggest that the payoff of sustained increases in agricultural growth on industrial growth
would be substantial.
6 Interactions and Robustness Checks
This section tests whether the results are robust to cross-country heterogeneity, non-macroeconomic
effects of growth in agriculture, changes in the sample, and the influence of outliers. It also provides
further discussion on the validity of the exclusion restriction in (4).
The sample used in this paper includes only developing countries, as opposed to the related
studies of Dell et al. (2012a) and Shifa (2014). Yet growth in agriculture may affect the manufac-
turing sector differently depending on country characteristics such as the share of agriculture in
GDP, or the degree of openness to trade. In table 6, I explore potential sources of heterogeneity
in two ways.
First, I estimate the baseline specification (including only contemporaneous growth in agricul-
ture) with a full set of year dummies interacted with quartile rank dummies. Each quartile rank
dummy indicates whether, at the time it entered the sample, a country belonged to that quartile
of the distribution of a given characteristic of interest. The characteristics include PPP-adjusted
GDP per capita, the share of agriculture in GDP, the share of imports and exports in GDP, and
the share of agricultural exports in GDP (for detailed sources and definitions, see table B.1 in the
Appendix).
These year-rank interactions absorb variation across countries belonging to different quartiles;
as a result, the coefficients are estimated only on the basis of variation within each quartile. In
other words, only similar countries (in terms of initial conditions) provide a yardstick to evaluate
the effect of agricultural growth in each country. Columns (1)-(4) show that little is changed by
adding year-rank interactions to the baseline LIML specification.14 The only noticeable change
occurs when the characteristic of interest is the share of agricultural exports in GDP, leading to
an increase in the point estimate to 0.62.
Second, I add the interaction between growth in agriculture and a dummy indicating whether,
at the time it entered the sample, a country was above the median in the distribution of each
of the characteristics above. Columns (5)-(8) show the results (’poor’ indicates a below-median
initial GDP per capita).15 As we can see, the interaction terms are too imprecisely estimated
to be statistically significant. Column (6) suggests a stronger effect of agricultural growth in
countries with a higher share of agriculture in GDP. In turn, columns (7) and (8) suggest a weaker
14Due to the limited number of countries, it is not possible to repeat this exercise with the Arellano-Bover-
Bond system GMM estimator, as the total number of instruments far exceeds the number of cross-sectional units
(Roodman, 2009).
15To estimate these specifications, I used the fitted values of a first-stage regression as the instrument for growth
in agriculture (for a discussion, see Wooldridge, 2010).
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effect in countries that are more open, or more oriented towards primary exports. One could find
justification for these differentials in the theoretical literature: as discussed in section 2, demand-
side complementarity between agriculture and industry hinges on the response of intersectoral
relative prices to increases in agricultural output. In small economies, greater openness to trade
may link many domestic relative prices to their counterparts in world markets, thereby narrowing
the scope for demand-side complementarity. But the available data warrants no firm inference in
this respect.
Table 7 shows the remaining robustness checks, with LIML estimates in the top panel, and
Arellano-Bover-Bond estimates in the second panel. Column (1) reproduces the baseline specifi-
cation for ease of comparison.
I first examine whether the effects so far credited to macroeconomic channels in fact take place
through political channels. An influential literature has shown that climate shocks increase the
likelihood of civil unrest and regime changes, especially in least developed countries (Miguel et al.,
2004; Hidalgo et al., 2010; Bru¨ckner and Ciccone, 2011). These forms of conflict emerge because
climate shocks hurt crop yields and rural livelihoods, so they are not independent of agricultural
growth. But the accompanying unrest may confound the more strictly macroeconomic effects that
motivate this paper.
To address this problem, I extend the baseline specification by adding up to two lags of an
indicator of civil conflict. This dummy variable indicates the existence of conflict of any type and
extent; it is based on Marshall (2013), who codes the severity of episodes of civil violence, civil
war, ethnic violence and ethnic war. The coefficients on the conflict dummies are negative and
statistically significant, but column (2) shows that the coefficient on agricultural growth remains
similar to the baseline levels.
Columns (3) and (4) show specifications estimated with an expanded sample (including coun-
tries with at least 20 consecutive observations), and with a reduced sample (including only coun-
tries with more than 30 consecutive observations). The estimates increase with the expanded
sample, but remain in the the 0.5-0.6 range.
The specifications in columns (5) and (6) examine the sensitivity of the results to influential
observations. The specification in column (5) excludes the observations whose residuals (obtained
from the baseline specification) are in the top or bottom percentiles. In turn, the estimates
in column (6) are obtained with a Winsorized (at 1%) dependent variable. As expected, these
procedures reduce the influence of outliers and lead to an overall reduction of about a decimal
point in the estimates. In the models estimated by LIML, however, the decline in the short-run
coefficients is partly compensated by higher persistence of growth in manufacturing, leading to only
modest changes in the long-run multipliers. The largest reduction occurred in the specification
with excluded outliers estimated by the Arellano-Bover-Bond procedure. In all cases, however, the
estimated impact of growth in agriculture remained practically large and statistically significant.16
Finally, a brief comment about the validity of the exclusion restriction in (4) is in order. There
is no question that annual variation in a country’s average temperature is exogenous to growth in
manufacturing or agriculture. But one may claim that variation in temperature has a direct impact
on growth in the manufacturing sector. For example, controlled experiments have documented a
decline in measures of worker productivity in non-agricultural activities with high temperatures
(Seppa¨nen and Vuolle, 2000; Seppa¨nen et al., 2006).
Controlled studies, however, are largely inconsequential to the main identification strategy of
this paper. First, this strategy relies only on deviations of a country’s annual temperature from
its long-term average. As seen in section 3, there is little annual variation in average temperature
within countries (the overall within-country standard deviation is only 0.5oC, with imperceptible
16These restrictions on influential observations are implemented only as a robustness check, as no a priori reason
exists to believe that the information they convey is less legitimate than that of the remaining observations.
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differences across regions). By contrast, controlled studies find that large increases in air tem-
perature are required for perceptible declines in productivity — for example, a 6oC increase in
temperature from a neutrality threshold of 25oC is required to cause a 10% decline in quantifiable
measures of worker performance (Seppa¨nen et al., 2006). These large swings in annual or seasonal
temperatures with respect to a region’s historical averages are implausible. Moreover, by virtue of
their controlled design, these studies fail to account for organizational adaptations that, over the
course of a year, could offset the effects of unusually high temperaturesgiven a region’s historical
record.
To be sure, it is possible that large but localized variation in temperature could have perceptible
effects on local non-agricultural output, while having only a modest effect on the countrywide
average temperature over a year (see, e.g. Zivin and Neidell, 2010, for a study using local U.S.
data collected at daily frequency). But it is difficult to claim that aggregate variation in the
dataset is systematically driven by such events. At any rate, given the impossibility of directly
testing the exclusion restriction, it is important to be cautious when interpreting the estimates as
literal predictions, as opposed to indicators of complementarity between agriculture and industry.
7 Potential Mechanisms
Section 2 discussed several channels through which the agricultural sector could relieve macroe-
conomic constraints on industrial growth, namely saving, demand, foreign exchange, and fiscal
constraints. This section provides suggestive evidence on the impact of growth in agriculture —
still instrumented by temperature — on proximate measures of these channels. The regressions
in this section therefore replace growth in manufacturing in the empirical model in (1) with other
outcomes of interest.
Table 8 summarizes the results. It shows that a one-off increase in agricultural growth leads to
a decline in the terms of trade between agriculture and the total economy, to higher shares of gross
capital formation and gross saving in GDP, to higher growth of real GDP per worker, to higher
growth in agricultural exports, and to a decline in the share of food in total merchandise imports.
These effects are statistically significant, but confined to the short-run. By contrast, the impact
on the share of merchandise trade in GDP is positive but imprecisely estimated, while the impact
on the share of trade tax revenues in GDP is near zero, indicating that, as agricultural growth
accelerates trade tax revenues increase on a par with GDP (for detailed variable definitions, see
table B.1 in the Appendix).
I estimate all specifications by system GMM using the Arellano-Bover-Bond moment condi-
tions, including four lags of the dependent variable in the case of variables defined as ratios, and
two lags in the case of variables defined as growth rates.17 With one exception, I add no other
controls, so as not to restrict the channels through which growth in agriculture can affect the
outcome variables.18
In general, the coefficients suggest that large shocks to growth in agriculture are required to
produce noticeable effects on most of these outcome variables. Large short-run shocks, however,
are empirically plausible, given the within-country volatility exhibited by agricultural growth. For
example, an increase in agricultural growth by one ‘within’ standard deviation (8.5 percentage
points) is expected to raise the contemporaneous share of gross capital formation in GDP by 1.82
percentage points, while lowering the share of food in merchandise imports by one percentage
point.
17I also report a single-tailed test of the hypothesis that the sum of lagged coefficients is less than one, to address
concerns with non-stationarity of the variables in ratios.
18The exception is the model with the terms of trade between agriculture and the total economy as a dependent
variable. That model controls for up to two lags of real GDP growth, so the counterfactual is characterized by a
given rate of GDP growth.
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The estimates in this section are consistent with the channels of complementarity described
earlier in the paper (and further investigated in the formal model of section 8). A reduction
in the intersectoral terms of trade, for example, is a mechanism indicating that higher growth
in agriculture can serve as an autonomous source of demand for industrial goods (for example,
by lowering the cost to workers of meeting their inelastic demand for food, and thus liberating
income to be spent on industrial goods). In turn, the expansion of agricultural exports and the
substitution of food imports are likely to raise the capacity to import industrial inputs, while the
expansion of trade tax revenues may help fund public investment in infrastructure.
At the same time, however, the empirical strategy in this section identified reduced-form effects,
which reflect short-run changes in other macroeconomic variables that may be induced by growth
in agriculture. It does not identify channels of complementarity free from these induced changes.
With this caveat in mind, it is still worth noting that growth in agriculture improves indicators of
different constraints that could bind industrial growth.
8 A Model of Growth Complementarity
In order to cast light on the empirical findings above, I now present a simple model of growth
complementarity between agriculture and industry. It extends the basic framework of ‘gap’ models
to examine how agriculture can ease different constraints on industrial capital accumulation.
Gap models start by identifying the main equality constraints that have to be satisfied as
accounting identities in equilibrium. The literature’s central contribution is the notion that one
of them will be binding on the feasible level of investment. The difference between this binding ex
ante constraint and its less stringent counterparts is called a ‘gap’. Since all equality constraints
have to be satisfied ex post, the literature has posited a range of mechanisms through which all
gaps are eventually eliminated (see, e.g. Chenery and Bruno, 1962; Bacha, 1990; Taylor, 1994).
I examine the interaction among three macroeconomic equality constraints: the aggregate
saving-investment balance; the balance of payments identity; and the government’s capital ac-
count. Regarding the saving-investment balance, I also consider two model closures: one in which
industrial accumulation is determined by saving, and one in which it is determined by an inde-
pendent investment function. I refer to the first case as the saving-constrained case, and to the
second as the demand-constrained case. For clarity, I consider the elimination of gaps between
two equality constraints at a time, with a focus on the contribution of agricultural development
to industrial accumulation.
8.1 General Framework
Table 9 summarizes the equations of the model. Equations (9.1)-(9.6) describe the general frame-
work shared by all model closures. Equation (9.1) shows that agricultural output — a pure
consumption good denoted by A — is produced with labor and a fixed input (e.g. effective land),
under conditions of diminishing marginal returns. Agriculture is traditional in the sense of Lewis
(1954), with employment determined as a residual after industrial firms make their hiring deci-
sions. I set the total labor force equal to unity and disregard population growth, so that 0 < la < 1
is the employment share of agriculture.
Agriculture is traditional also in that labor incomes are linked to the value of the average
product. But I allow for class differentiation and the appropriation of rents. Equation (9.2) thus
shows that the product wage in agriculture is proportional to the average product of labor (ωa),
with 0 < β < 1 denoting the share of output appropriated by the rentier class.
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Equation (9.3) shows that industrial output (M) is produced with labor and capital according
to a Leontieff production function, where q and σ are the output-labor and output-capital coef-
ficients. The stock of utilized capital is the binding constraint on industrial output, determining
industrial employment and thus rural employment as a residual. Industrial firms operate in im-
perfect competition and strive to maintain a desired level of excess capacity in order to respond
to unforeseen demand shocks. For simplicity, I only consider growth paths along which utilization
is at the desired level, so that σ can be treated as a constant.19
Domestic industrial goods can be used either for consumption or for investment. But to model
how a shortage of foreign exchange can hinder accumulation, I assume that the private capital
stock in industry (Km) is a composite of domestic (Kd) and imported (Ki) investment goods.
They are utilized in fixed proportions, with 0 < m < 1 denoting the share of imported goods. The
value of the capital stock in domestic currency is given by equation (9.4), where pm is the price
of the domestic industrial good, p∗k is the world price of the imported capital good, and x is the
nominal exchange rate.
To allow agriculture to contribute net foreign exchange earnings, I assume that part of its
output, denoted by Ea, is exported. I examine this contribution of agriculture under two implicit
assumptions. The first is that domestic industry faces an inelastic world demand. The second is
that endogenous changes in the nominal exchange rate are unlikely to smoothly correct current
account imbalances (for evidence, see Chinn and Wei, 2013). Since it is difficult to establish
a foothold in new markets, this is the typical short-run scenario in many semi-industrialized
economies. As a result, these economies have often adopted contractionary monetary and fiscal
policies to correct current account imbalances in the face of external borrowing constraints, giving
rise to stop-and-go cycles (Ocampo, 2003). The present model shows that agricultural exports
can obviate the need for contractionary policies in this scenario.20
To ensure that the model reflects this scenario with maximum simplicity, I disregard exports
(or imports) of the domestic industrial good, and the short-run impact of exchange rate movements
on the trade balance. In addition, I follow Taylor (1989) and further assume that xp∗k = pm = pk,
where p∗k is given and pm is a domestically-determined price, since manufacturing output is not
traded (see equation 9.5). Doing so allows me to treat the industrial capital stock as if it were
homogeneous.
Assuming that foreign capital goods comprise all of the economy’s imports, equation (9.11)
gives the balance of payments identity. The terms κ and ea denote net external borrowing and
agricultural exports as a ratio of the capital stock, while ge is the rate of accumulation that, for
given values of κ and ea, is consistent with the balance of payments identity.
The quantity of agricultural exports is determined through a quota auctioned off by the gov-
ernment. This stylized assumption has two advantages. First, it collapses export-promoting policy
levers into a single exogenous variable. Second, it links agricultural exports to government rev-
enues, illustrating one of the typical forms of indirectly taxing agriculture in developing countries
(see, e.g. Rao, 1989a).
Quota rents are the only source of funds to finance public capital expenditures, which are en-
tirely directed to the domestic investment good. Equation (9.6) thus shows that public investment
(Ig) is equal to the quantity of agricultural exports times the difference between the economy’s
external terms of trade (p∗a/p∗k) and the domestic terms of trade of agriculture (p = pa/pm), which I
assume to be always positive.
19In other words, I only consider ’warranted’ growth paths (Harrod, 1939). For an analysis of the convergence to
these paths in labor-surplus economies, see Nakatani and Skott (2007), and Skott (2010).
20To be sure, in the medium and long runs developing countries have a broader menu of choices to reconcile
external balance with growth targets. For a discussion of the use of competitive exchange rates under an elastic
long-run demand for industrial exports, see Razmi et al. (2012).
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In sum, the model’s setup is such that an exogenous increase in the domestic supply of agri-
cultural goods affects wage income, as well as the level and composition of domestic demand for
industrial goods. In turn, an exogenous increase in agricultural exports raises foreign exchange
receipts and government revenues.
8.2 Saving and Foreign Exchange Constraints
I begin by considering the classical case of saving-driven investment in industry, in which agricul-
tural growth can raise saving out of profits by lowering industrial costs. Following Lewis (1954),
nominal wages in agriculture determine nominal wages in industry, up to an exogenous constant
of proportionality (assumed equal to unity). Thus, the product wage in industry (wm/pm) is a
positive function of the average product in agriculture (ωa) and the domestic terms of trade (p),
as in equation (9.8).
Social classes have different saving propensities, with no consumption out of profits and rents,
and no saving out of wages. Workers in agriculture and industry divide their consumption expen-
ditures between the industrial and the agricultural goods, and they share the same preferences.
Equation (9.9) shows the equilibrium condition of the market for agricultural goods, where f(.)
denotes the quantity of the agricultural good demanded by each worker. This equation determines
the domestic terms of trade (p) as a function of the average product in agriculture (ωa).
Industrial firms are the only private agents that accumulate capital. Since the government cap-
ital account is assumed to be always balanced, equation (9.10) shows that the saving-constrained
rate of private capital accumulation (gs) is equal to total domestic and foreign saving as a ratio
to the industrial capital stock (κ denotes net borrowing from abroad as a ratio of the industrial
capital stock).
Under these conditions, the following proposition can be established:
Proposition 8.1. If the wage bill in the industrial sector exceeds the value of agricultural rents,
an increase in labor productivity (and thus output) in agriculture will raise the saving-constrained
rate of industrial accumulation if η < 1− .
where η > 0 is the income elasticity of demand for the agricultural good and  > 0 is the
elasticity of substitution between the two goods. Both of these elasticities are assumed constant
regardless of the level and composition of consumption.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Engel’s law — the proposition according to which the share of agricultural goods in total
consumption declines with the level of income — plays a central role in ensuring growth comple-
mentarity between the two sectors in this setting. It implies a value of η below one. Since demand
for food in developing countries is likely to be price-inelastic (i.e. with a low ), plausible Engel’s
effects are likely to be strong enough to ensure that the inequality in proposition 8.1 holds in most
cases (for a classic statement of a similar proposition, see Jorgenson, 1961). The proposition would
thus be valid in countries where voluntary net lending from agricultural rentiers is not too high
relative to the size of the industrial sector — a condition likely to be verified in most developing
countries (Karshenas, 1995).
The intuition behind the proposition is as follows. An increase in agricultural output — as a
result of technical progress, or of a short-run weather shock — raises both agricultural rents and
industrial costs in terms of the agricultural good. The η < 1−  condition, however, ensures that
the corresponding changes in terms of the industrial good go the opposite way: the deterioration
in the terms of trade will be large enough as to raise industrial profits and reduce the value of
16
agricultural rents in terms of the industrial good. In other words, higher wage earnings will be
more than proportionately spent on industrial goods, translating into lower unit labor costs for
industry and higher saving out of profits. The net effect on total domestic saving will be positive if
the industrial wage bill — which weighs on saving out of industrial profits — exceeds agricultural
rents.
The additional ex ante saving elicited by growth in agriculture, however, may not be absorbed
by domestic demand due to balance-of-payments constraints. As mentioned above, I capture this
possibility by assuming that a share 0 < m < 1 of total investment is comprised of an imported
investment good.
To see how the saving and foreign exchange constraints interact, consider panel (a) in Fig-
ure 1. It plots the accumulation rate consistent with goods market equilibrium (denoted by gs,
from equation 9.10), and the accumulation rate consistent with the balance of payments identity
(denoted by ge, from equation 9.11), both as a function of κ. The resulting schedules are upward-
sloping, although ge is steeper since 0 < m < 1. At point A, both relations hold as accounting
identities, but industrial growth is constrained by domestic saving and net borrowing from abroad
adjusts endogenously. If proposition 8.1 holds, an increase in labor productivity in agriculture
will shift the gs schedule up. With the real value of agricultural exports given, the increased
demand for imported capital goods is accommodated by higher net borrowing from abroad. The
economy moves to point A′, where industrial growth is higher. In other words, if accumulation is
constrained by domestic saving, proposition 8.1 ensures that higher agricultural output enhances
industrial growth.
But most developing countries face restrictions in international capital markets if the ratio of
net borrowing to GDP rises above a perceived threshold of sustainability. Therefore assume that
κ cannot exceed κmax. At point B in figure 1(a), the economy is constrained by foreign exchange
availability. Higher agricultural output would raise ex ante saving, but the impossibility of im-
porting additional capital goods would generate a demand shortfall in the market for industrial
goods. Ex post saving would then be brought into line with demand in Keynesian fashion, with a
reduction in the income of those with a positive propensity to save.21 The economy would return
to point B.
Growth in agriculture can relieve this foreign exchange constraint if a rise in exports accom-
panies the rise in output. For example, consider a coordinated increase in agricultural output and
exports (i.e. ωa and ea) so as to leave the domestic terms of trade (p) constant. This exercise
would shift the ge schedule up, and would have an ambiguous effect on the ex ante gs schedule (it
would raise saving out of rural rents, but reduce saving out of industrial profits). But as long as
the foreign exchange constraint remains binding, this coordinated increase would raise equilibrium
industrial growth by allowing for higher imports of capital goods. The economy would move from
point B to point B′.
8.3 Demand and Foreign Exchange Constraints
A Keynesian-type demand constraint can emerge if two conditions are satisfied. First, if invest-
ment decisions are made independently of saving decisions; and, second, if a mechanism exists
to endogenously bring actual saving into line with desired investment. Following Kaldor (1957)
21With capacity utilization at the long-run desired level, the adjustment requires dissaving through a decline in
industrial profits. As further discussed in section 8.3 below, a Keynesian macro closure ensures that a demand
shortfall in the market for industrial goods reduces the rate of industrial price inflation relative to nominal wage
growth, raising wm/pm endogenously and reducing saving out of industrial profits. This closure would in general
detach urban earnings from rural earnings, however, so that a demand-constrained Keynesian closure is in general
incompatible with an exogenous wage premium between the two sectors. In addition, since balance-of-payments
constraints do not directly actuate on individual firms, in practice the reduction in aggregate demand tends to be
achieved through contractionary fiscal or monetary policies.
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and Robinson (1962), I examine endogenous changes in functional distribution in the industrial
sector as one such mechanism. As it turns out, functional distribution cannot respond to demand
fluctuations in the market for industrial goods if the intersectoral terms of trade are determined
by market equilibrium and the nominal wages in industry are pinned down by the value of rural
wages, as in the saving-constrained economy just described.22 Rather, a demand constraint re-
quires that industrial product wages vary endogenously to clear the market for industrial goods, as
long as the participation constraint of industrial workers is satisfied (i.e. wm > wa, as in equation
9.12).
The aggregate saving-investment balance now gives equation (9.14), where gi = h(wm/pm) is
the independent investment function, and h′ < 0. With capacity utilization at the desired level,
wm/pm is uniquely and negatively related to the industrial profit rate. In turn, the equilibrium
condition for the market for agricultural goods is now given by (9.15).
Equations (9.14) and (9.15) jointly determine the domestic terms of trade and the industrial
product wage, which in turn determines the equilibrium rate of accumulation. The following
proposition can be thus be established:
Proposition 8.2. Provided the market for industrial goods is stable, an increase in labor pro-
ductivity in agriculture will raise the demand-constrained rate of industrial accumulation if η <
1− + Eaωala−Ea .
Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. An increase in agricultural output raises saving
out of agricultural rents in terms of the agricultural good, but it also causes a decline in the terms
of trade of agriculture. If Engel’s effects are strong enough, the decline in the terms of trade will
more than offset the increase in agricultural rents in terms of the agricultural good. As a result,
total ex ante saving will decline in terms of the industrial good.23
The counterpart of this reduction in ex ante saving is excess demand for industrial goods.
The reason is that the initial decline in agriculture’s terms of trade reduces the cost to industrial
workers of meeting their income-inelastic demand for food, freeing up income which is more than
proportionately spent on industrial goods. If the equilibrium is stable (i.e. industrial saving reacts
more strongly to changes in profitability than industrial investment), the market is cleared by an
increase in the price of the industrial good relative to the nominal wage. The ensuing redistribution
towards industrial profits will raise desired accumulation and bring about an increase in saving
out of industrial profits to finance it. This result — whereby an ex ante decline in saving results
in an ex post increase in saving and accumulation — is akin to the Keynesian paradox of thrift.
It also resonates with previous analyses of two-sector models with a demand constraint (see, e.g.,
Taylor, 1982; Skott and Larudee, 1998).
Panel (b) in figure 1 depicts, in the (g, κ) space, the interaction of the goods market equilibrium
schedule in (9.14), denoted by gd, and the balance of payments identity in (9.11), denoted again by
ge. The gd schedule is downward-sloping: with an independently given investment function, a rise
22Mathematically, the introduction of an independent investment function requires the introduction of a new
endogenous variable. For a classic exposition of the problem in a one-sector model, see Marglin (1984). For
restatements in two-sector models, see Dutt (1992) and Rada (2007).
23The decline in ex ante agricultural saving in terms of the industrial good will also be greater the higher the share
of exports in total agricultural output, as they are a component of agricultural incomes that does not contribute
to the domestic supply of food. An increase in this domestic supply will thus have a higher proportional impact
on the terms of trade if its initial value is low relatively to total agricultural incomes, easing the need for strong
Engel’s effects. It is easy to see that in a closed economy the condition for an increase in agricultural productivity
to raise equilibrium growth is the same in the saving-constrained and demand-constrained regimes (with different
interpretations of the underlying economic mechanisms).
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in κ has to be the counterpart of lower agricultural exports, which reduce government revenues
and its purchases of domestic investment goods for capital formation (see equation 9.6).
At point A, the economy is demand-constrained. Under the conditions of proposition 8.2,
higher productivity in agriculture shifts the gd schedule up and raises equilibrium growth (to A′),
at the cost of higher net borrowing from abroad. By contrast, if the rate of net borrowing is at the
maximum level, even if ex ante aggregate demand is high enough to sustain growth above point
B′ when κ = κmax, the economy will be unable to import the required capital goods. This foreign
exchange constraint lowers effective investment demand, so that the ex post gd schedule passes
through point B.24 Now increases in agricultural output are ineffective if exports don’t increase
as well.
As before, a policy experiment designed to raise both agricultural output and exports while
leaving the terms of trade constant can ease this binding foreign exchange constraint by shifting
the ge schedule up. Equilibrium growth would thus rise to a point like B′.
8.4 Fiscal and Demand Constraints
As discussed in section 2, technical complementarity may exist between public infrastructure and
private investment projects. As a result, private projects which would be profitable given expected
demand may not be undertaken in the absence of complementary public investment. The model’s
set-up, where ea is determined through a quota imposed and auctioned by the government, lends
itself to analyzing the typical case in which growth in agriculture can fund public investment even
when the sector’s incomes are not directly taxed (see section 2).
To see how a fiscal constraint interacts with a demand constraint, assume that private accu-
mulation responds only to private profitability as long as a high enough level of public investment
is provided. If public investment falls short of this minimum, however, it becomes a binding
constraint on private accumulation. The investment function can then be recast in discontinuous
form, as in equation (9.16), where α > 0 is a constant of proportionality.
Panel (c) in figure 1 shows the interaction between the demand and the fiscal constraints. The
gd schedule shows equation (9.14) in the (ea, g) space.
25 The curve describing the scaled rate of
public capital formation (αIg/Km), in turn, is concave. On the one hand, higher exports raise quota
rents for given domestic terms of trade (p). But, on the other hand, they raise the domestic terms
of trade, and thus lower the wedge relative to border prices created by the policy.
As drawn, the diagram shows an economy constrained by private demand between points B
and C. At point A, however, public capital formation is low enough to become a binding constraint
on private investment. The so-constrained private investment causes the gd schedule to shift down
so that it, too, intercepts A — an endogenous decline in the profit rate ensures saving-investment
balance. Higher agricultural exports can ease the binding fiscal constraint and move the economy
from A to A′, where industrial growth is higher.
8.5 Summary
The model exemplified basic macroeconomic mechanisms through which growth in agriculture can
remove binding constraints on the rate of industrial accumulation in developing countries. In the
24In practice, the decline in investment demand in the face of a balance-of-payments constraint is brought about
by contractionary policies, as the balance-of-payments constraint does not act upon individual firms.
25A ceteris paribus increase in agricultural exports has ambiguous effects on aggregate demand for industrial
goods. On the one hand, it restricts domestic agricultural supply and increases the terms of trade, reducing demand
out of industrial wages. On the other hand, it increases government revenues and capital expenditures, which
are directed to domestic industrial goods. As drawn, the schedule embodies the assumption that the first effect
predominates. The substantive results do not depend on this assumption.
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case of saving and demand constraints, Engel’s effects in the final demand for agricultural goods —
an uncontested stylized fact — play a pivotal role in ensuring growth complementarity between the
two sectors, echoing previous analyses (e.g. Jorgenson, 1961; Taylor, 1982). When combined with
net export expansion, growth in agriculture can also ease foreign exchange constraints on industrial
investment. Finally, if public and private capital are complementary, growth in agriculture can
ease fiscal constraints on private accumulation, as it can increase real fiscal revenues either directly
or indirectly (see also Rao, 1993).
The model shows that supply shocks to agriculture can sway industrial firms in their output
growth and capital accumulation decisions, casting light on key structural mechanisms behind the
empirical finding that growth in agriculture elicits growth in manufacturing.
9 Conclusion
Development economists have long examined macroeconomic channels through which development
in agriculture can support the expansion of high-productivity activities, particularly in manufac-
turing. The complementarity between the two sectors has also been a centerpiece of historical
studies of industrialization. Efforts to identify causal effects using country-level datasets, on the
other hand, are comparatively recent. This paper makes a contribution to this literature.
Using variation in population-weighted average temperature as an instrument for growth in
agriculture, my baseline estimates show that it has large short-run impacts on manufacturing: an
increase in annual growth in agriculture by one percentage point is estimated to raise contempo-
raneous growth in manufacturing by between 0.47 and 0.56 percentage point. Baseline estimates
of the long-run effects of a permanent increase in agricultural growth are also large (between 0.53
and 0.58 percentage points), although short-run variation in the instrument is better suited to
capture short-run effects.
The paper also presented a stylized two-sector model to illuminate the channels through which
such complementarity might arise. The model focused on agriculture’s classic roles as a source
of saving, foreign exchange, fiscal revenues, and a home market for industry. It demonstrated
that even short-run supply shocks to agriculture can induce industrial firms to revise their output
growth and capital accumulation decisions, and that persistent increases in agricultural growth —
due to continuing technical change and factor accumulation — can lead to persistent increases in
industrial growth. Further empirical estimates showed that growth in agriculture favorably affects
indicators of the channels of complementarity highlighted in the model.
My findings have two broad implications. The first is negative in outlook: given that large neg-
ative shocks to agricultural output are frequent in the sample, especially among poorer countries,
my estimates suggest that their cost in foregone industrial output can be severe, and that they
may abruptly interrupt processes of industrial growth. The use of modern inputs in agriculture
to reduce its vulnerability to weather shocks is important not only for increasing income security
among rural residents, but also for preventing regressive structural change in the economy.
The second implication is that sustained agricultural development should be a key ingredient
of policies promoting long-term industrialization. A thorough discussion of the type of agricultural
development most conducive to industrial growth, however, is beyond the scope of this paper (for
a discussion, see Rao and Caballero, 1990). Suffice it to say that successful cases of industrial-
ization were often accompanied by technical dynamism in agriculture and a broad distribution of
its benefits. Enabling conditions have included equitable land tenure systems and, in countries
characterized by hidden unemployment, a pattern of technical change focused on increasing output
and the utilization of rural labor. In successful cases of industrialization in Asia, the widespread
adoption of land-augmenting innovations, such as intensive cropping, fertilizers, and high-yielding
varieties, has proven to be conducive to these goals (Smith, 1959; Ishikawa, 1967; Lee, 1979; Kay,
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2001). They stand in contrast to innovations designed to primarily economize on labor, which
characterized some Latin American experiences and arguably worsened the problem of hidden un-
employment (De Janvry, 1978; Sanders and Ruttan, 1978). Achieving such technical dynamism, as
well as an adequate output response to demand fluctuations, has also required public investment
in research and extension, and in complementary rural infrastructure. It is therefore essential to
examine the forms these policies may take in contemporary processes of development.
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Appendix
A Proofs of Propositions
A.1 Proof of Proposition 8.1
Since the export quota is an exogenous policy variable, it follows from (9.9) that
dp
dωa
=
(
η − 1
ωa
)
p (A.1)
where η > 0 and  > 0 are the constant elasticities of income and substitution. From (9.10)
and (A.1), it follows that
∂gs
∂ωa
> 0⇔ [β − (1− la)]η − 1

> −[β − (1− la)] (A.2)
If (1− la) > β, (A.2) will be satisfied if η < 1− . Note that (1− la) > β implies (1− la)ωapa >
βωapa , i.e., that the wage bill in the industrial sector exceeds the value of agricultural rents.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 8.2
From (9.15), it follows that
dp
dωa
= −pla
[
1− fAωa η
lafA+ (1− la)fM + (1− la)fMη
]
(A.3)
where, for notational ease, I define fA = f [(1− β)ωa, p] and fM = f [wm/pm1/p, p], that is, the
per-worker demand for agricultural goods in the agricultural and industrial sectors. The equation
above also relies on the assumption of constant elasticities of income (η) and substitution ().
If the Keynesian stability condition holds, i.e.,
∣∣∣σq ∣∣∣ > |h′|, the necessary and sufficient condition
for an increase in ωa to raise accumulation is for it to reduce the value of agricultural saving in
terms of the industrial good, that is:
dgD
dωa
> 0⇔
d
[
βωalap
Km
]
dωa
= p+ ωa
dp
dωa
< 0 (A.4)
Combining (A.3) and (A.4), along with the market equilibrium condition of ωala = f
Ala +
fM (1− la) + Ea yields Proposition 8.2.
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B Data Sources and Variable Definitions
Table B.1: Data Sources and Variable Definitions
Source/Definition
General
Sectoral real value added WDI
Population-weighted average temperature Dell et al. (2012a)
Table 3
Set 1 : Stocks
Human capital stock PWT 8
PPP-adjusted GDP per capita (log) PWT 8
Set 1 : Flows
Real exchange rate undervaluation (log) Rodrik (2008), calculated with data from PWT 8
External terms of trade (log) PWT 8
Set 2: Stocks
Polity II score Marshall et al. (2013), updated.
Set 2: Flows
Merchandise trade (% of GDP) PWT 8
Real exchange rate volatility PWT 8, defined as standard deviation over each period.
Gross capital formation (% of GDP) PWT 8
Government consumption (% of GDP) PWT 8
Table 6
PPP-adjusted GDP per capita PWT 8
Share of agriculture in GDP WDI
Agricultural exports FAO
Merchandise trade (% of GDP) PWT 8
Table 7
Civil conflict Marshall (2013)
Table 8
Gross capital formation (% of GDP) WDI
Gross saving (% of GDP) WDI
Labor Productivity PWT 8, defined as real GDP per person engaged
Agricultural exports FAO
Food imports over merchandise imports WDI
Merchandise trade (% of GDP) PWT 8
Trade tax revenues (% of GDP) Baunsgaard and Keen (2010)
Note: WDI: World Development Indicators. PWT 8: Penn World Table version 8.0. FAO: Food and Agriculture
Organization.
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Figure 1: Pairwise Interaction of Saving, Foreign Exchange, Demand, and Fiscal Constraints
(a) Saving and Foreign
Exchange Constraints
(b) Demand and Foreign
Exchange Constraints
(c) Demand and Fiscal
Constraints
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Growth and Temperature
Mean Standard Deviation Countries
Overall Within Between
Growth in Agriculture (%/yr.)
All Countries 2.67 8.62 8.54 1.22 62
Asia and Pacific Islands 3.01 4.78 4.74 0.69 13
Latin America and Caribbean 2.57 6.00 5.92 1.02 17
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.27 9.81 9.74 1.19 24
Middle East and North Africa 3.79 14.16 14.08 1.63 7
Growth in Manufacturing (%/yr.)
All Countries 4.51 8.55 8.17 2.51 62
Asia and Pacific Islands 6.85 7.69 7.23 2.81 13
Latin America and Caribbean 3.29 6.74 6.58 1.53 17
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.68 10.30 10.04 2.28 24
Middle East and North Africa 5.78 7.60 7.49 1.36 7
Weighted Temperature (oC/yr.)
All Countries 21.83 4.48 0.49 4.48 62
Asia and Pacific Islands 22.76 4.90 0.34 5.00 13
Latin America and Caribbean 21.19 4.04 0.51 4.13 17
Sub-Saharan Africa 23.22 3.78 0.48 3.83 24
Middle East and North Africa 17.37 3.83 0.63 4.07 7
Notes: The decomposition of the overall standard deviation was obtained by using the following
transformation: y˜i,t = yi,t − y¯i + y¯. Where y denotes the variable of interest, i denotes countries, t
denotes years, y¯i denotes the average of y across time in country i, and y¯ denotes the overall average
of y. The within-country standard deviation is the standard deviation of y˜i,t, while the between-
country standard deviation is given by the standard deviation of y¯i across all countries. For details
about the data sources, see the Appendix.
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Table 3: Benchmark estimates without temperature as an instrument.
Model with five-year averages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS/FE OLS/FE OLS/FE SGMM SGMM SGMM SGMM
∆ ln (Agr. V.A.) 0.116*** 0.143*** 0.145*** 0.116** 0.592*** 0.491*** 0.527***
(0.041) (0.044) (0.044) (0.047) (0.143) (0.137) (0.161)
∆ ln (Agr. V.A.)t−1 0.109*** 0.114*** 0.094***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.031)
∆ ln (Agr. V.A.)t−2 0.060*** 0.071*** 0.051**
(0.021) (0.024) (0.022)
∆ ln (Agr. V.A.)t−3 0.031
(0.023)
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls N N N N N set 1 sets 1+2∑
∆ ln (Agr. V.A.) 0.116 0.312 0.361 0.261 0.592 0.491 0.527
p-value 0.007 0 0 0.001 0 0.001 0.002
Lags of ∆ ln (Man. V.A.) 2 2 2 2 1 1 1∑
∆ ln (Man. V.A.) 0.054 0.028 0.048 0.082 0.187 0.130 0.084
p-value 0.331 0.615 0.269 0.145 0.032 0.118 0.280
Long-run Multiplier 0.123 0.321 0.380 0.284 0.728 0.565 0.576
p-value 0.008 0 0 0 0 0.001 0.004
Num. of GMM Instruments 52 14 20 33
Lags of GMM Instruments 2 2 2 2
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.331 0.343 0.323 0.168
Hansen test (p-value) 0.182 0.158 0.683 0.242
Countries 62 62 62 62 62 55 55
Avg. Obs. per Country 36.048 35.952 35.194 35.952 6.226 6.309 6.309
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The dependent variable is growth in real value added in the manufacturing sector. Standard errors robust to
arbitrary forms of correlation within countries are in parentheses. Columns labeled ”OLS/FE” indicate the fixed-effects
estimator, while columns labeled ”SGMM” indicate the Arellano-Bover-Bond system GMM estimator (see description in
the text). All specifications include a set of year or period dummies. The specifications in columns (6) and (7) also include
the sets of control variables described in the text (for detailed variable definitions for each set, see the data appendix). The
SGMM estimates of the specifications in columns (5)-(7) were obtained using two lags of the lagged dependent variable and
of all all endogenous flow variables (with the exception of the external terms of trade) as instruments for the transformed
equation. The instrument matrix was collapsed to avoid instrument proliferation (Roodman, 2009).
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Table 4: ‘First stage’ and reduced form regressions
‘First Stage’ Regressions Reduced Form Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS/FE OLS/FE OLS/FE OLS/FE OLS/FE OLS/FE SGMM
ln(wtem) -0.338*** -0.469*** -0.468*** -0.526** -0.234** -0.293*** -0.276***
(0.094) (0.144) (0.141) (0.210) (0.088) (0.088) (0.080)
ln(wtem)t−1 0.354** 0.317* 0.403* 0.112 0.129*
(0.165) (0.170) (0.218) (0.074) (0.076)
ln(wtem)t−2 0.151 0.116 0.085 0.139
(0.106) (0.116) (0.082) (0.091)
ln(wtem)t−3 -0.097 -0.090 -0.007 -0.008
(0.104) (0.127) (0.062) (0.059)
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Region-Year FE N N N Y N N N
Controls N N N N N N N
F-Stat of ln(wtem) 13.055 6.313 3.301 1.841 7.006 3.379 3.954
p-value 0.001 0.003 0.016 0.132 0.010 0.015 0.006∑
ln (temp) -0.338 -0.115 -0.096 -0.097 -0.234 -0.103 -0.016
p-value 0.001 0.166 0.265 0.412 0.010 0.402 0.332
Lags of ∆ ln (Man. V.A.) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2∑
∆ ln (Man. V.A.) 0.017 0.024 0.025 0.036 0.054 0.085 0.118
p-value 0.550 0.423 0.417 0.243 0.337 0.063 0.037
Countries 62 62 62 62 62 62 62
Avg. Obs. per Country 36.065 36.065 36.032 36.032 36.145 36.113 36.113
Long-run Multiplier -0.247 -0.113 -0.018
p-value 0.011 0.402 0.331
Num. of GMM Instruments 53
Lags of GMM Instruments 2
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.457
Hansen test (p-value) 0.117
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The dependent variable in the ”first-stage” regressions (columns 1-4) is growth in real value added in agriculture. The
dependent variable in the reduced-form regressions (columns 5-7) is growth in real value added in manufacturing. Ln(wtem)
indicates the log of population-weighted average temperature. All specifications include a set of year dummies and two lags of
growth in manufacturing. Specification (4) includes a set of region-specific dummies, where the regions are Middle-East and North
Africa; Sub-Saharan Africa; Latin America and the Caribbean; Asia and Pacific Islands. Standard errors robust to arbitrary forms
of correlation within countries are in parentheses. Columns labeled ”OLS/FE” indicate the fixed-effects estimator, while columns
labeled ”SGMM” indicate the Arellano-Bover-Bond system GMM estimator (see description in the text).
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Table 5: Baseline estimates with temperature as instrument for agricultural growth.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
GMM GMM LIML GMM LIML SGMM SGMM
∆ ln (Agr. V.A.) 0.684** 0.547*** 0.559*** 0.581*** 0.581*** 0.476** 0.455***
(0.280) (0.185) (0.190) (0.182) (0.185) (0.185) (0.157)
∆ ln (Agr. V.A.)t−1 0.157 0.157 0.201
(0.193) (0.200) (0.191)
∆ ln (Agr. V.A.)t−2 0.112 0.112 0.046
(0.145) (0.147) (0.166)
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lags of ∆ ln (Man. V.A.) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2∑
∆ ln (Man. V.A.) 0.043 0.045 0.045 0.030 0.030 0.102 0.089
p-value 0.423 0.399 0.394 0.629 0.631 0.050 0.274
Long-run Multiplier 0.714 0.573 0.586 0.876 0.876 0.530 0.771
p-value 0.015 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.012 0.036
Lags of ln(temperature) 0 1 1 3 3 1 3
Anderson-Rubin Stat 7.127 14.457 14.457 14.060 14.060
p-value 0.008 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.007
Stock-Wright Stat 6.354 10.078 10.078 10.150 10.150
p-value 0.012 0.006 0.006 0.038 0.038
Kleibergen-Paap Stat. 13.062 6.316 6.316 2.388 2.388
Cragg-Donald Stat 14.489 14.131 14.131 6.678 6.678
10% Max Size Crit. Val. 16.380 19.930 8.680 n/a n/a
15% Max Size Crit. Val. 8.960 11.590 5.330 n/a n/a
Hansen test (p-value) 0.479 0.481 0.998 0.998 0.444 0.253
Num. of GMM Instruments 51 53
Lags of GMM Instruments 2 2
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.636 0.564
Countries 62 62 62 62 62 62 62
Avg. Obs. per Country 36.048 36.048 36.048 35.919 35.919 36.048 35.919
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The dependent variable is growth in real value added in the manufacturing sector. Standard errors robust to arbitrary forms
of correlation within countries are in parentheses. Columns labeled ’GMM’ indicate that the GMM method was used for estimating
the models with more instruments than endogenous variables. Columns labeled ’LIML’ indicate that the Limited Information
Maximum Likelihood method was used instead. Columns labeled ’SGMM’ indicate the use of the Arellano-Bover-Bond system
GMM method (for a description, see the text). The Stock-Yogo critical values for maximal size distortion were computed for the
Cragg-Donald F statistic, which assumes i.i.d. disturbances. They were reported only when available.
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Table 6: Robustness Checks and Interaction Effects
Year-Quartile Rank Dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
gdp agr. share agr. exp. trade poor agr. share agr. exp. trade
per cap. in gdp in gdp in gdp in gdp in gdp in gdp
∆ ln (Agr. V.A.) 0.554*** 0.513*** 0.625*** 0.555*** 0.543*** 0.525*** 0.611*** 0.678***
(0.185) (0.183) (0.201) (0.171) (0.173) (0.183) (0.232) (0.254)
Interaction 0.025 0.291 -0.208 -0.249
(0.230) (0.337) (0.236) (0.234)
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE N N N N Y Y Y Y
Year-Rank FE Y Y Y Y N N N N
Lags of ∆ ln (Man. V.A.) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2∑
∆ ln (Man. V.A.) 0.042 0.054 0.051 0.046 0.045 0.047 0.047 0.041
p-value 0.397 0.193 0.344 0.342 0.396 0.384 0.378 0.445
Long-run Multiplier 0.578 0.542 0.659 0.582 0.569 0.551 0.641 0.707
p-value 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.009 0.007
Lags of ln(temperature) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Anderson-Rubin Stat 15.854 15.693 12.791 15.680 15.599 16.183 15.639 14.461
p-value 0 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 0.001
Stock-Wright Stat 10.281 10.136 10.253 11.300 10.509 12.474 10.752 10.113
p-value 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.006
Kleibergen-Paap Stat. 8.119 6.094 4.268 5.650 3.104 2.515 4.859 4.468
Cragg-Donald Stat 15.124 14.267 10.800 15.088 12.692 9.408 14.892 14.777
10% Max Size Crit. Val. 8.680 8.680 8.680 8.680 7.03 7.03 7.03 7.03
15% Max Size Crit. Val. 5.330 5.330 5.330 5.330 4.58 4.58 4.58 4.58
Countries 62 58 59 61 62 62 62 62
Avg. Obs. per Country 36.048 35.966 36.424 36.082 36.048 36.048 36.048 36.048
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The dependent variable is growth in real value added in the manufacturing sector. All specifications were estimated by the
Limited Information Maximum Likelihood method. Standard errors robust to arbitrary forms of correlation within countries are in
parentheses. Columns (1)-(4) include a full set of interaction dummies between year and the rank of a country in the quartiles of each
characteristic at the time the country enters the sample. The characteristics of interest are listed in the column headers (for detailed
variable definitions, see the text and the data appendix). The variable ’interaction’ in columns (5)-(8) denotes the interaction term
between growth in agriculture and a dummy indicating whether a country lies above the overall median in the distribution of each
characteristic at the time the country enters the sample (’poor’ indicates whether a country lies below the overall median of GDP per
capita). The Stock-Yogo critical values for maximal size distortion were computed for the Cragg-Donald F statistic, which assumes
i.i.d. disturbances.
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Table 7: Additional Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline Conflict > 20 obs > 30 obs Truncated Winsorized
Outliers Dep. Var.
LIML Estimates
∆ ln (Agr. V.A.) 0.559*** 0.577*** 0.627*** 0.548*** 0.470*** 0.486***
(0.190) (0.203) (0.210) (0.177) (0.178) (0.168)
Long-run Multiplier 0.586 0.609 0.666 0.580 0.542 0.534
p-value 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.008 0.004
Hansen test (p-value) 0.481 0.396 0.450 0.493 0.462 0.603
Countries 62 61 70 54 62 62
Avg. Obs. per Country 36.048 36 34.214 37.796 34.113 36.048
Arellano-Bover-Bond SGMM Estimates
∆ ln (Agr. V.A.) 0.476** 0.492** 0.565** 0.418** 0.286** 0.384**
(0.185) (0.203) (0.243) (0.183) (0.126) (0.145)
Long-run Multiplier 0.530 0.558 0.634 0.481 0.347 0.443
p-value 0.012 0.017 0.022 0.027 0.036 0.012
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.636 0.679 0.584 0.761 0.216 0.878
Hansen test (p-value) 0.444 0.468 0.356 0.220 0.172 0.481
Countries 62 61 70 54 62 62
Avg. Obs. per Country 36.048 36 34.214 37.796 34.177 36.048
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The dependent variable is growth in real value added in the manufacturing sector. The specifications in
the top panel were estimated by the Limited Information Maximum Likelihood method using the within transfor-
mation. The specifications in the bottom panel were estimated by system GMM using the Arellano-Bover-Bond
moment conditions. Standard errors robust to arbitrary forms of correlation within countries are in parentheses.
All specifications include a full set of year dummies and use the contemporaneous plus one lag of temperature as
instruments for growth in agriculture. Column (2) includes up to two lags of a dummy indicating the existence of
civil conflict (see the text and the Appendix for detailed variable definitions). Columns (3) and (4) include countries
with at least 20 and 30 consecutive observations, respectively. Column (5) drops the observations whose residuals
(obtained from the baseline specification) are in the top or bottom percentiles. Column (6) uses a Winsorized (at
1%) dependent variable.
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Table 8: Impact of Agricultural Growth on Potential Mechanisms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
agr/total gross gross labor agr. food merch. trade
t.o.t. cap. form. saving prod. exports imports trade tax rev.
(log) (% gdp) (% gdp) (growth) (growth) (% total) (% gdp) (% gdp)
∆ ln (Agr. V.A.) -0.687** 0.222* 0.441*** 0.407* 1.853** -0.128* 0.474 -0.055
(0.309) (0.113) (0.146) (0.223) (0.792) (0.068) (0.402) (0.037)
∆ ln (Agr. V.A.)t−1 -0.056 -0 -0.036 -0.104 1.642 -0.072 0.048 -0.032
(0.439) (0.099) (0.222) (0.185) (1.037) (0.088) (0.430) (0.033)
∆ ln (Agr. V.A.)t−2 0.256 -0.094 0.141 0.021 0.359 0.010 0.252 -0.061
(0.290) (0.120) (0.161) (0.138) (0.827) (0.071) (0.379) (0.059)
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y N N N N N N N
Lags of Dep. Var 4 4 4 2 2 4 4 4∑
Lagged Dep. Var. 0.953 0.928 0.950 0.222 -0.353 0.957 0.932 0.978
Ho:
∑
< 1 (p-value) 0.996 0.886 0.990 1 1 0.806 0.981 0.736
Long-run Multiplier -10.370 1.768 11.005 0.417 2.849 -4.442 11.393 -6.730
p-val 0.381 0.535 0.061 0.433 0.033 0.465 0.380 0.638
Num. of GMM Instruments 59 59 55 53 52 54 56 41
Lags of GMM Instruments 2 5 1 2 2 2 2 2
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.624 0.477 0.248 0.402 0.632 0.796 0.455 0.584
Hansen test (p-value) 0.137 0.126 0.145 0.563 0.224 0.072 0.849 0.304
Countries 62 62 62 57 59 62 57 54
Avg. Obs. per Country 36.516 37.129 37.452 34.947 38.220 23.806 37.719 23.574
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The dependent variables are as follows. Column (1): the log of the terms of trade between agriculture and the total economy; column
(2): gross capital formation as a share of GDP; column (3): gross saving as a share of GDP; column (4): annual growth rate of real GDP
per person engaged; column (5): annual growth rate of real agricultural exports; column (6): food imports as a share of total merchandise
imports; column (7): the sum of merchandise exports and imports as a share of GDP; column (8): trade taxes as a share of GDP (see the
data Appendix for detailed definitions). All specifications were estimated by system GMM according to the Arellano-Bover-Bond procedure
with three lags of temperature as external instruments for agricultural growth. Standard errors robust to arbitrary forms of correlation
within countries are in parentheses. Columns (1) includes two lags of GDP growth as controls.
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Table 9: Model Equations
General Framework:
A = φla
1−δ, φ > 0 and 0 < δ < 1 (9.1)
wa
pa
= (1− β)φla−δ = (1− β)ωa, 0 < β < 1 (9.2)
M = Min(q(1− la), σKm) (9.3)
pkKm = (1−m)pmKd +mxp∗kKi (9.4)
xp∗k = pm = pk (9.5)
Ig =
[
x
p∗a
pm
− p
]
Ea =
[
p∗a
p∗k
− p
]
Ea (9.6)
p =
pa
pm
(9.7)
Saving Constraint:
wm
pm
= (1− β)ωap (9.8)
ωala = f [(1−β)ωa, p]+Ea, f1 > 0 and f2 < 0 (9.9)
gs =
[
1− (1− β)ωa
qm
p
]
σm + β
ωala
Km
p+ κ (9.10)
Foreign Exchange Constraint:
ge =
1
m
(
p∗a
p∗k
ea + κ
)
(9.11)
Demand Constraint:
wm > wa (9.12)
gi = gi(rm) = h
(
wm
pm
)
, h′ < 0 (9.13)
gi =
[
1− wm
pm
1
qm
]
σm + β
ωala
Km
p+ κ (9.14)
ωala = f [(1− β)ωa, p]la + f
[
wm
pm
1
p
, p
]
(1− la) +Ea (9.15)
Fiscal Constraint:
gi =

h
(
wm
pm
)
if h
(
wm
pm
)
≤ α Ig
Km
α
Ig
Km
if h
(
wm
pm
)
> α
Ig
Km
(9.16)
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